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NOTE
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS
The Indian Bill of Rights was enacted into law on April
11, 1968.1 The 1968 Indian Bill of Rights 2  guaranteed tribal
members certain rights against tribal infringement similar to
the rights guaranteed to individuals by the Bill of Rights as
protection against encroachment by state and federal governments.
The rights granted to each Indian include amendments one
and four through eight of the Bill of Rights with the following
exceptions: establishment of religion is not prohibited; the right
to counsel is guaranteed only at the defendant's own expense; there
is no right to indictment by a grand jury; and the petit jury right
assures a jury of six members in all cases involving the possibility
of imprisonment.3 In addition to the language from the Bill of
1. Act of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-03 (1970).
2. Id.
3. Id. The text is as follows:
§ 1302. Constitutional rights
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,' or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue war-
rants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized ;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the as-
sistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual
punishments, and in no event Impose for conviction of any one offense any
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Rights, two other Constitutional word formulas are included: the
requirement that the tribe not "deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of its laws, ' 4 and the prohibition against
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.5 The writ of habeas
corpus is the only remedy mentioned in the Act.6
Among the most important rights granted by the new law is
the right to due process of law.7 This right is likely to have
far reaching effects on tribal institutions. The question that arises
is how to interpret the due process clause of the Indian Bill of
Rights. It could be interpreted to mean exactly what it means
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution, or it could be interpreted to include standards which recog-
nize tribal culture and values. In interpreting the Due Process Clause
of the Indian Bill of Rights, courts should realize that a literal
reading of the provisions to mean exactly what the standards are
as applied to state and federal governments would result in seriously
undermining the tribe's cultural autonomy and may even threaten
the tribe's capacity for survival in the long run. One writer has
posed the question as follows:
Is it justifiable to impose federal notions of Due Process on
tribal courts when these rights are not seen as fundamental
by Indians and when countervailing factors, unique to the
Indian context, militate against such an imposition?8
The purpose of this Note is to show that due process need
not mean the same for tribes as for non-Indian America through
a discussion of the past and present federal policy in regard to
the historical doctrine of tribal sovereignty and by discussion of
the legislative history and purpose of the Indian Bill of Rights.
A discussion of the recent interpretations of the Due Process Clause
of the Indian Bill of Rights by the federal courts follows with sug-
gestions as to how the federal courts should approach Title II.
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months
or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of Its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post factor law;
or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment
the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
§ 1303. Habeas corpus
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any per-
son, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by
order of an Indian tribe.
Id.
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970).
5. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(9) (1970).
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970).
8. Coulter, Federal Law and Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the
1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3 CoLum. SuRvY I- uMAn RIGHTS 49 (1971).
NOTE
I. THE DOCTRINE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Formal recognition of the relationship between the tribe and
the U.S. Government came in 1832 from the Supreme Court in
the case of Worcester v. Georgia.9 Chief Justice Marshall pointed
out that:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from
time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed
by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse
with any other European potentate than the first discoverer
of the coast of the particular region claimed. . . The very
term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people
distinct from others.' '0
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion announced the theory of tribal sov-
ereignty which has determined the Federal judiciary's basic policy
toward Indian tribes for the past 130 years.1 ' This theory has been
refined. The contemporary meaning of tribal sovereignty is defined
in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation,'2
as follows:
It would seem clear that the Constitution, as construed by the
Supreme Court, acknowledges the paramount authority of
the United States with regard to Indian tribes but recognizes
the existence of Indian tribes as quasi sovereign entities pos-
sessing all the inherent rights of sovereignty excepting where
restrictions have been placed thereon by the United States,
itself.'8
The courts have repeatedly upheld the quasi sovereign status
cf the tribe; 1 4 however, Congress has the prerogative of placing
limitations upon tribal autonomy. Congress significantly eroded tri-
9. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). The controversy involved an attempt by
the State of Georgia to exercise Jurisdiction over the Cherokee Reservation contained geo-
graphically within its borders and convict a missionary for violation of a state law pro-
hibiting anyone from residing on the reservation without a license. Chief Justice Marshall
reversed the Georgia Supreme Court and stated that the Cherokee nation was "a distinct
community ... in which the laws of Georgia can have no force. Id. at 560.
10. Id. at 559 (1832).
11. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TI
CoNG., 2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 1 (1964).
12. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F.2d 89 (1956).
13. Id. at 92. For a discussion of three principles involved in the scope of the meaning of
tribal sovereignty see F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (1940 ed.).
14. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). The Supreme Court refused to apply
the fifth amendment to the Constitution to invalidate a tribal law that established a five
man grandjury; In Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th
Cir. 1959), the Court by implication, held that a.tribal Indian cannot claim protection from
illegal search and seizure protected by the fourth amendment. However, the courts have
not consistently upheld the internal sovereignty of the tribes. See, e.g., State v. Forman,
16 Tenn. 256 (1835). See generally, M. PicE, Law and the American Indian 46 (1973).
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bal sovereignty between 1830 and the early 1900s, 15 a period which
may be referred to as the "assimilationist period."'8 "The first at-
tempt by Congress to control the internal affairs of Indians was
the establishment of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in 1924."'1
Also of great importance was the passage of the Major Crimes
Act which gave to the federal courts jurisdiction over certain major
crimes committed on reservations. 8 Then in 1934, with the passage
of the Wheeler-Howard or Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),19 Con-
gress changed its policy. The principal effect of the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act was to re-establish Indian reservation land and reaffirm
the concept of tribal sovereignty. 20 After World War II Congress
again turned to its earlier assimilation plan. This act, termed the
"Termination Policy," granted jurisdiction to specified states and
an option to those states not specified to hear both civil and criminal
matters between Indians or arising on Indian land.2 1
The present federal policy emphasizes the earlier philosophy
of the Indian Reorganization Act. The concept of tribal sovereignty
seems to be the theme of the present U.S. policy. 22 At the same
time that Congress enacted the Indian Bill of Rights, it also modi-
fied the existing law to require the consent of the tribe as a con-
dition to any assumption of civil or criminal jurisdiction by the
15. Note, Indian Bill of Rights, 5 Sw. U.L. REV. 139, 143 (1973).
16. An important legislative measure of this period was the Dawes or General Allot-
ment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), which divided Indian reservation land into small
parcels allotted to individual Indians and excess was to be sold to American settlers. See
also the Citizenship Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253 (1924), 8 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
17. Note. supra note 15 at 143. The BIA was established to "manage and superintend
the intercourse with the Indians" and "to carry into effect such regulations as may be pre-
scribed by the President." Id. at 143.
18. Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362 (1885), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1970). The original act included murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill,
assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary and larceny. It was amended to include
the offenses of incest and robbery (Act of June 28, 1932, ch. 284, 47 Stat. 336) ; carnal know-
ledge and assault with intent to commit rape (Pub. L. No. 89-707, § 1, 80 Stat, 1100 (1966))
and assault resulting in serious bodily injury (Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 501, 82 Stat. 80 (1968))
The Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970). See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
19. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970).
20. Sections 16 and 17 of the Act allowed Indian tribes to incorporate and adopt consti-
tutions of self government. The internal sovereignty exercised by the tribes under the IRA
was not seen as granted by the Act, but as residual power, unextinguished in the preceding
years. For a discussion of the Act itself and Its objectives see Comment, Tribal Self-
Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MicH. L. REV. 955 (1972).
21. Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970). 25 U.S.C. §
1323(a) (1970) authorizes the U.S. to accept retrocession of jurisdiction granted under the
Act. 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1970) now requires the consent of the tribe before a state can as-
sume civil jurisdiction over it.
22. President Johnson in his message to Congress in support of the Indian Civil Rights
Act endorsed Indian Tribal Sovereignty and self-government:
I propose a new goal for our Indian programs: a goal that ends the old de-
bate about "termination" of Indian programs and stresses self-determination;
a goal that erases old attitudes of paternalism and promotes partnership and
self-help . . . I propose in short, a policy of maximum choice for the Ameri-
can Indian: a policy expressed In programs of self-help, self-development, and
self-determination.
President's Address to Congress, March 6, 1968, 114 CoNe. REC. 5894, 5395 (1968). This
policy was adopted by the Nixon Administration. Supra note 8 at 139, 146 n.41 (1978), cit-
ing W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND, WHI'E MANSs LAW 90, 97 (1971).
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states.28 As a result, the tribe has the option of remaining a distinct
community. This means the continued existence of substantial pol-
itical power in the tribal governments.
The significance of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty cannot
be overstated. Although federal Indian policy has fluctuated over
the years, in fact the courts have consistently applied this concept
and now Congress has come to recognize it as something perma-
nent. Tribal sovereignty was a primary catalyst in the adoption
of the Indian Bill of Rights.24 Before its passage the Indian had
no federally protected rights against the tribe. His only protection
was the tribal code and constitution.2 5 But most important, if the
Indian Bill of Rights is to reflect the present federal policy of
"self-help, self-development, and self-determination ' 26 for Indians,
then these concepts must be recognized in establishing standards
under the Due Process Clause of the Indian Bill of Rights. In con-
struing the statute courts should remember that the courts and
Congress have strongly supported the policy of allowing Indian tribes
to maintain their governmental and cultural identity.
II. THE INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1961, the subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee
began a series of hearings on the legal status of the Indian in
America and the problems Indians encounter when asserting con-
stitutional rights in the relations with state, federal, and tribal
governments.27 This congressional attention to the problems of the
Indians concerning their constitutional rights spanned seven years.2 8
Hearings were commenced in Washington and moved to California,
Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, North and South Dakota and finally
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970).
24. Note, supra note 15 at 146.
25. Several tribal constitutions contain provisions purporting to protect the Indian against
tribal action which is contrary to the Federal Constitution. Such a provision Is found in
the constitution of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, act IV, sec. 1, p. 2. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2d. SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 5 (1964).
26. President's Address to Congress, March 6, 1968, 114 Cong. Rec. 5394, 5395 (1968)
see also Note, supra note 17 at 146 (1973).
27. H.R. No.'15419 and Related Bills, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968).
28. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1
(1962), 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1963), 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 (1963), and 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4 (1964) [Hereinafter cited as 1961-63 Senate Hearings]. STAFF OF
SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D
SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (Comm. Print 1964) ; Hearings on
Constitutional Rights of the American Irdian, S. 961-68 & S. J. Ren. 40, Before the Sub-
Comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN ;(Comm.
Print 1966); Hearings on Rights of Members of Indian Tribes Before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Internal and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968).
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were concluded in Washington. 29 These hearings were held in areas
where the subcommittee could receive the views of the largest num-
ber of Indian tribes. 80 Additional committee hearings were held
in 1965, s ' and another investigative report followed in 196632 The
committee reported the bill, as later passed, to the Senate; 3 it
passed after only perfunctory discussion.3 4 Hearings on the bill were
then held in the House.35 As the House was not moving fast enough
on the bill to please Senator Ervin, he amended S. 1843 onto the
House Civil Rights Bill under consideration in the Senate in order
to force consideration of the Indian Bill of Rights in the full House.3 6
The House accepted the amendment, with some discussion on the
floor concerning the lack of substantive consideration in the House. 7
Though it is not the purpose of this Note to discuss the merits
of this legislation, it should be pointed out that it is easy to conclude
from the foregoing that legislation passed after such long and care-
ful deliberation is of necessity sound. However, how do the Indians
view their "Bill of Rights?" According to one source, Indians view
it as a further weakening of Indian self-government in the name
of protecting Indians from their own people3 s That critic states:
"They see the Indian Bill of Rights as another imposition by
a white government of white standards, values and governmental
theory upon once sovereign tribes." 39 It is difficult to assess the
extent of opposition, but its very existence makes it even more
imperative that the courts in applying the Due Process Clause of
the Indian Bill of Rights recognize the historical concept of tribal
sovereignty and the distinct features of tribal culture.
29. H.R. 15419 and Related Bills, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1968).
30. Id.
31. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian S. 961-68 & S.J. Res. 40
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
32. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
89TH CONG., 2D SESS. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (Comm. Print 1966)
33. S. REP. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
34. 113 CONG. REC. 35, 471-77 (1967).
85. Hearings oIl Rights of Members of Indian Tribes Before The Snbcomm. on Indian
Affairs of the House Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
36. 114 CONG. REC. 2459-62 (1968). See Rieblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 10 ARIZ. L. REv. 617, 619 (1968).
37. 114 CONG. REc. 9552-53 (1968). On the day of the statute's passage, Wayne N.
Aspinall, Representative from Colorado, and Chairman of the House Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, opposed passage of the proposed legislation on the ground that the
House committee had not had time to fully consider the merits of the proposal relating to
Indians. See Rieblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 10 ARIZ. L. REv.
617, 618 (1968).
38. Coulter, supra note 8 at 50.
39. Id. See also Kerr, Constitutional Rights, Tribal Justice and the American Indian, 18 J.
Pun. L. 311, 333 (1969) which states that the Indians general response to the Indian Bill
of Rights was one of apathy and in some cases opposition. For a critical analysis of the
Indian Bill of Rights see, Warren, An Analysis of the Indian Bill of Rights, 33 MONT. L.
REv. 255 (1972). In addition, it is important to note that though Indian country has been
described as a civil rights "no man's land," tribal members are more likely to find mean-
ingful protection on the reservation rather than off it. It Is claimed that there is pervasive
discrimination against Indians off the reservation. Senate Hearings on Constitutional Rights,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 817-71 (1964) ; F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 400 (1940 ed.).
NOTE
1. An Interpretation ot the Legislative Intent
The purpose of the subcommittee's investigation was "to seek
to ascertain whether our Indians understand their basic rights under
the Federal Constitution and whether these rights are adequately
protected. '40 Most of the hearings focused on the question of wheth-
er or not those charged with offenses were receiving any procedural
rights.4 1 The hearings revealed that judges seldom have any legal
training, and there are no professional prosecutors. 42 Furthermore,
the tribes have allowed defendants to have only non-attorney repre-
sentatives as counsel, 43 and this privilege is seldom exercised.4 4
One provision of Title II specifies that in a tribal court a criminal
defendant shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel.4 5 This pro-
vision engendered much discussion and some Indian tribes expressed
the fear that a defense lawyer in a tribal court would so confuse
the lay judges with formalistic demands that the system might
collapse. 46 Considerable doubt as to whether a right to retained
counsel is either necessary or desirable for the informal Indian
trial has been expressed by several commentators 47 and there has
been considerable litigation in this area.4 s The legislative hearings
also developed additional information concerning the criminal justice
systems of the tribes. 49
The hearings produced little information about the substantive
practices of tribal courts and governments." However, discussion
of the Indian Bill of Rights showed no intent- to use the statute
as a means for modifying tribal cultural attitudes in order to facili-
tate assimilation of Indians into the non-Indian community.5 In
fact, the committee exhibited a positive desire to avoid any injury
40. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2,
285 (1963).
41. For a discussion of the hearings, see Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Consti-
tutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1355-60 (1969).
42. Id. at 1357.
43. 1961-63 Senate Hearings, supra note 28 at 13, 54, 73, 427, 608, 825; 1965 Senate
Hearings, supra note 31 at 138.
.44. 1961-63 Senate Hearings, supra note 28 at 247-50.
45. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1970).
46. 114 CoNG. REc. 9540, 9614 (1968).
47. Coulter, Fed. Law and Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968
Indian Bill of Rights, 3 COLUM. SuavEY HUMAN RIasTs L. 49 (1972) ; Reiblich, Indian
Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 10 ARIz. L. REV. 617, 628-32 (1968).
48. Reagan v. Blackfeet Tribal Court, Civil No. 001254, 001255, (D. Mont. 1969) (action
arising from expulsion and suspension by tribe of two lawyers from tribal court practice) ;
Claw v. Armstrong, Civil No. 001085 (D. Colo. 1970) (action to compel tribal court to pro-
vide counsel and establish procedure for granting Jury trials) ; Wasson v. Gray, Civil No.
001015, (D.N.M. 1971) (action to restrain federal and tribal officials from excluding attor.
neys from tribal administrative building) ; Towersap v. Fort Hall Indian Tribal Council,
Civil No. 001103 (D. Idaho 1971) (action to compel tribal court to allow Indian plaintiffs
professional legal counsel).
49. Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments
82 HAv. L. REv. 1843, 1356-59 (1969).
50. Id. at 1358-59.
51. Id. at 1359.
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to the tribes' capacity to function as autonomous governmental units.
In addition to continually asking witnesses in the hearings whether
the imposition of criminal procedural standards would be too heavy
a burden on the tribal courts, 52 Senator Sam Ervin stated: "We
have no desire to interfere with or to cut into tribal authority.
We seek only to strengthen that and at the same time strengthen
the rights of the American Indians, both under tribal authority
and under the Constitution. ' 53 During the hearings on the proposed
legislation numerous witnesses pointed out the peculiarities of the
Indians' economic and social conditions, his customs, beliefs and
attitudes that would raise serious questions about the desirability
of imposing upon them forms and procedures to which they were
unaccustomed." Therefore, the focus of the legislative committee
was upon establishing new individual rights for Indians balanced
by a recognition of the importance of tribal sovereignty.
Little attention was given by the subcommittee to determining
and evaluating standards of review. The committee's adoption of
constitutional language was not the result of serious consideration
of the problem of standards, but an easy way to avoid its difficulties.
Furthermore, it is important to note that though some of the lan-
guage is taken virtually word for word, the Indian Bill of Rights
is not an exact reproduction of the language of the Federal Bill
of Rights. There are several important differences. In the guarantee
of freedom of religion,5 5 the clause prohibiting the "establishment
of religion" was purposely deleted in consideration of the theocratic
nature of some tribal governments. 6 The Fifth Amendment right
to a grand jury indictment was also omitted in view of the limited
criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts.57 There is a guarantee of
the right to trial by jury, but it is limited to criminal cases, and
then by a six-man jury.58 These modifications appear to be a recog-
nition of the informal nature of proceedings in the tribal courts.
The Indian Bill of Rights also guarantees the right to be repre-
sented by counsel, but only at the defendant's expense. 59 This mod-
ification was made in view of the fact that most Indian tribes
have no organized bar association so attorneys are not generally
available, and prosecution in tribal courts is often informal and
52. 1961-63 Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 99, 147, 873-75.
53. Id. at 287 (Senator Ervin quoted by Senator Carroll).
54. Rieblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 10 ArIZ. L. Rrv. 617,
622 (1968).
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1970).
56. Hearing on H.R. 15419 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 23 at 26
(1968) (Hereinafter House Hearings].
57. Lazarus, Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 N.D. L.
REv. 337, 339 (1969).
58. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (1970).
59. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1970).
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may be presented without the assistance of professional attorneys.6 0
Also the expertise of trained counsel is not necessary where only
traditional and customary law is involved.61 In addition, two provi-
sions in the original bill were deleted in deference to the different
nature of some Indian tribal governments. The right of appeal from
an adverse decision in a tribal court and a trial de novo in the
federal district court in criminal cases were omitted62-on the ground
that the Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary thought they were
too disruptive of tribal self-government." Also the Subcommittee
recognized that the tribes, as ethnic units, must restrict voting
on tribal matters to the members of their particular tribe and
withdrew the Fifteenth Amendment guarantee that voting would
not be restricted because of race.6 4 Therefore, though originally
the same restraints imposed on the federal government were to
be imposed on the Indian tribes,6 5 the Indian Bill of Rights was
tailored to Indian needs in response to the differences of Indian
culture and government.6
Although the committee stated as one of its recommendations
that "[t]he constitutional rights and protections conferred upon
American citizens should be made applicable to American Indians
in their relationship with their tribal governing bodies, ' ' 67 certainly
the differences between the Indian Bill of Rights and the U.S. Bill
of Rights make it plain that Congress did not intend to impose
the same limitations on the tribes as are imposed on the state
and federal governments.
The legislative history indicates a positive concern to balance
individual rights with tribal sovereignty. It, therefore, follows that
application of Anglo-American standards of due process in tribal
systems of justice 'and government would not be compatible with
the concept of tribal sovereignty and would result in the destruction
of tribal procedure and culture. The legislative history and resulting
bill strongly suggest that the Due Process Clause of the Indian
Bill of Rights should be interpreted only with careful reference
60. Lazarus, supra note 57 at 339-40 quoting House Hearings, supra note 56 at 26-27.
61. Id. at 340.
62. Hearings on S. 961 etc. Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 91 (1965) ; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CoNG., 2D SESS.,
SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 9 (Comm. Print 1966).
63. Lazarus, supra note 57 a:t 347.
64. Note, supra note 15 at 150.
65. 110 CONG. REC. 17329 (1964).
66. Lazarus, supra note 57 at 845-48.
67. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JU-
DICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 23 (1964). See 114 CONG. REC. 9596 (1968)
(remarks of Congressman Mead that, "The provisions of the Bill of Rights are not identi-
cal to the Federal Constitution's Bill of Rights, and the differences are largely in order to
accommodate tribal customs").
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to the context of the particular tribal culture, customs, and form
of government.
B. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS
The federal judiciary may have the most important role in ad-
ministering change in the tribal justice systems.68 Certainly deci-
sions as to how broadly the 1968 legislation will affect traditional
practices will be made by these courts, especially at the district
level. The most litigated provision of the Indian Bill of Rights is
its assurance that no person within its jurisdiction will be denied
the equal protection of its laws or deprived of liberty or property
without due process of law.6 9 To date the federal courts have been
undecided as to what these ambiguous phrases grant to Indians.
Though several courts have entertained suits alleging denials of
due process, little has been stated to clarify these terms.7 0 In this
area judicial awareness of tribal institutions and culture and of the
legislative history is especially important.7' The legislative history
appears to reflect that the Indian Bill of Rights requires a limited
construction which in turn involves an analysis of its development.
It does not authorize the court to apply broadly such a concept
as due process, but requires a sensitive regard for its impact on
tribal structures and values. This point is fully revealed by the
foregoing discussion of seven years of legislative history.7 2
In deciding cases involving the due process clause, some courts
have not engaged in the sort of historical discussion and analysis
that should be essential. In Johnson v. Tower Elwha Tribal Com-
munity7 1 an action to determine whether a tribe must grant hearings
prior to cancellation of an assignment of right to use tribal land,
the court concluded that the due process and equal protection clause
in the Indian Bill of Rights have the same meaning as those clauses
as applied to the United States and the states in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.7 4 Another recent example of this interpre-
tation is Crave v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians75 where the court
stated:
The terms 'due process of law' and 'equal protection of the
laws' are not susceptible of exact or comprehensive defini-
68. Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, 9 HAxv. J.
LEOIs. 557, 617 (1972).
69. 25 U.S.C. §'1302(8) (1970).
70. Courts have had to struggle with a more fundamental Droblem-whether they had
jurisdiction initially to decide such Intratribal controversies notwithstanding the guarantees
of the Indian Bill of Rights. Note, supra note 15 at 150.
71. See Burnett, supra note 68.
72. See text accompanying footnotes 50 through 67, supra.
73. Johnson v. Tower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973).
74. Id. at 202-03.
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tion. What is due process of law depends on the circumstances
and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the
situation. By due process of law is meant one which, follow-
ing the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and just to
the parties affected. What is due process may be ascertained
in part by an examination of those settled usages and modes
of proceedings existing before. .... 76
Applying those principles to the action taken by the Tribal Council
of Eastern Band of Cherokees the court found itself compelled to
find that the plaintiff's property was taken without notice and hear-
ing and thus without due process of law.77 These courts and others78
seem to be rushing to extract and apply standards found and de-
fined in the U.S. Constitution.
However, another approach was taken by the federal district
court for northeastern North Dakota in Lohnes v. Cloud7 9 The
plaintiff in this case brought an action for damages resulting from
an auto accident on the Fort Totten Indian Reservation and alleged
that the "Tribal Court, as it is instituted, relative to civil proceed-
ings, is unconstitutional in that it violates the due process provisions
of the Indian Bill of Rights, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (8).,",o The district
court in Lohnes, confronted with a jurisdictional challenge in the
form of a motion to dismiss, granted the motion, but on the theory
that the civil rights violation complained of-denial of a jury trial
in tribal court for a tort action-was in fact tribal action tolerated
by the terms of the Indian Bill of Rights."'
It is the court's reasoning in Lohnes that is of immense signi-
ficance. The court in Lohnes took pains to trace the legislative
history of the Indian Bill of Rights and to analyze the doctrine
of tribal sovereignty. The court quoting the Eighth Circuit language
in O'Neal which is instructive as to the restrictive application of
§ 1302 to tribal courts, as well as the rationale underlying it, stated:
'Congress clearly did not intend to detract from the continued
vitality of the tribal courts by passage of this legislation...'
at 1144, n.1.
'However, it is clear to us that Congress wished to protect
and preserve individual rights of the Indian peoples, with the
75. Crave v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Civil No. 3412 (D.N.C. Feb. 11, 1974)
(emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., U.S. v. Brown, 834 F. Supp. 536 (D. Neb. 1971) ; Daly v. U.S., 483 F.2d
700 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Armstrong v. Harvard, Civil No. 6-72-CI-U-315 (Jan. 22, 1974).
79. Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619 (1973).
80. Id. at 620.
81. Id. at 623. Implicit in the court's holding, however, was the conclusion that If a jury
trial had been denied in a criminal proceeding, this would have been proscribed by the In-
dian Bill of Rights. The court would then have had jurisdiction to Impose an equitable
remedy thus limiting this exercise of the tribe's power.
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realization that this goal is best achieved by maintaining the
unique Indian culture and necessarily strengthening tribal
governments.'
'Prior to the adoption of the Indian Bill of Rights, the courts
respected the need of Indians to maintain strong tribal gov-
ernments.'
'Since the passage of the Indian Bill of Rights we have recog-
nized the fear that courts may apply broadly such elusive
and expanding concepts as due process . . .without sensitive
regard for their impact on tribal structures and values.'8 2
These passages clearly indicate the court in Lohnes recognized
the need for sensitivity to the legislative history and doctrine of
tribal sovereignty. The thrust of the court's reasoning is that the
lengthy legislative history of the Indian Bill of Rights and a long
standing federal policy of respect for tribal self-determination re-
quire that a clear distinction be maintained between the require-
ments imposed on the tribe through the Indian Bill of Rights and
the requirements imposed upon federal and state governments
through the Bill of Rights and the U.S. Constitution.
Thus, as a federal court is faced with applying the broad lan-
guage found in the Indian Bill of Rights, two divergent approaches
to the question of defining standards are available. The courts in
Johnson3 and Crave8 4 have merely avoided any difficulties by ig-
noring legislative history as well as the present federal policy con-
cerning Indians by applying already existing standards under the
Bill of Rights. But the district court in Lohnes85 properly meets
the issue of determining standards by going to the heart of the
Indian Bill of Rights and the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.
III. CONCLUSION
As one commentator aptly points out, "[F]or Indians, tribal
sovereignty is not an abstract concept, a cultural relic, or even
a vanishing institution."8 To the members, an Indian tribe repre-
sents a dominant force in their economic and social lives as well
as the local government ST The present federal policy emphasizes
self-determination concerning the Indian Community.88 This policy,
82. Id. at 623 quoting O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1144-45 (8th
Cir. 1973).
83. 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir., Sept. 4, 1973).
84. Civil No. 8412 (D.N.C., Feb. 11, 1974).
85. 366 F. Supp. 619 (1973).
86. Lazarus, supra note 57 at 345 (1969).
87. Id. at 346.
88. 117 CONG. REc. 46383 (1971) ; See also Message to Congress on Indian Affairs from
President Richard M. Nixon, July 8, 1970.
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set forth in Senate Concurrent Resolution 26, as passed on December
11, 1971, stated:
That it is the sense of Congress that- (3) improving the qual-
ity and quantity of social and economic development efforts
for the Indian people and maximizing opportunities for Indian
control and self-determination shall be a major goal of our
national Indian policy; ...9
The historic right of the Indians to self-determination demands
a high order of respect for their institutions and culture. Moreover,
the legislative history of Title II makes it clear that the enactment
of the Indian Bill of Rights was to be a tool for strengthening
tribal institutions,and not a weapon for their destruction. 0 The In-
dian Bill of Rights was tailored to tribal life-for instance, the
Senate committee made changes in the Act to protect tribal ethnic
identity and theocracy. 91 The Congressional intent was clearly to
preserve tribal sovereignty 2 while assuring greater protection of
individual rights. Therefore, in interpreting the Due Process Clause
of the Indian Bill of Rights and exacting standards, the courts
must weigh and balance individual rights and tribal values.98 The
courts must make decisions weighing both these interests thought
by Congress to be important. To do this, courts will have to receive
evidence on the customs and culture of the particular tribe and
will have to recognize the historical doctrine of tribal sovereignty
and the legislative history of the Indian Bill of Rights. Congress
could not include in the Indian Bill of Rights all accommodations
to Indian culture; it is the responsibility of the courts to respond
to the individual situations. The judicial doctrines developed in cases
being brought under the Indian Bill of Rights are of tremendous
importance in defining the future direction of tribal sovereignty.
It is necessary to realize that the Indian Bill of Rights could dra-
matically limit the exercise of tribal self-government. The courts
89. Id.
90. See Note, supra note 49 at 1356-59.
91. Note, supra note 15 at 160.
92. Hearings on H.R. 15419 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Iadian Affairs of
the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1968). Re-
ma'ks of Edward Weinberg In describing the Interior Department's "selective" approach,
which the Subcommittee adopted: "we were concerned that certain of the limitations placed
by the Constitution upon the powers of the Federal Government, if imposed upon tribal
governments, would be disruptive of those governments out of all proportion to the pro-
tection they would afford individuals."
93. See Note, supra note 15 at 163; Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and The Constitu-
tional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1369 (1969). Ona commentator
opposes weighing individual rights against tribal self-government stating that, "in a non-
Indian tribunal It is all too easy to foresee how the balance is likely to be struck." He
suggests that, "the due process clause should be taken to guarantee fundamental fairness in
the particular context of tribal culture and self-government." Coulter, Federal Law and
Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3
COLUM. SURVEY HUMAN RIGHTS L. 49, 92 (Jan. 1971).
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must respect what so aptly was expressed by a Santo Domingo Pueblo
to the Senate Subcommittee:
The things you value, that which makes life, meaningful to
you are not the same with us in many respects.9
MARY L. MUEHLEN
94. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Anmerican Indian Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1969).
